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 This thesis contributes to the behavioral health literature and literature regarding 
healthcare financial incentive programs by discussing the influences of the behavioral 
economic concept of projection bias on programs designed to recruit healthcare providers 
to rural or underserved areas. First, I propose an adaptation to the model of projection 
bias by introducing a term that captures variability in individuals’ propensity to exhibit 
projection bias based on the amount of effort expended in predicting future preferences. 
Next, I conduct a probit model regression to observe what incentive program design 
features and participant characteristics are likely to influence the probability of exhibiting 
projection bias and therefore affect the efficacy of two incentive programs. Results 
suggest that incentive programs targeted to students are more likely to experience higher 
magnitudes of projection bias among participants, resulting in higher default rates, 
compared to professional-targeted programs. This is potentially due to the temporal gap, 
or length of time between when an individual decides to participate in the incentive 
program, thereby agreeing to practice in a shortage area in the future, and carrying out the 
service obligation. Furthermore, within the student-targeted program, the longer the 
training of participants, the more prone they are to exhibit projection bias and default on 
their obligation. This research also includes a survival analysis to identify what variables 
are related to a longer length of practice in one’s initial shortage area.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Residents of nonmetropolitan areas, which are defined as communities with 
populations under 50,000 residents, are one of the largest medically underserved 
populations in the United States. Twenty percent of the U.S. population lives in 
nonmetropolitan areas, yet less than ten percent of primary care providers practice in such 
areas (Rosenblatt and Hart 2000). In addition to a geographic imbalance of healthcare 
practitioners, nonmetropolitan residents suffer from higher rates of chronic diseases and 
disability, report higher levels of obesity, are older on average, and are more likely to 
report being in poorer health than their metropolitan counterparts (Ricketts 2000 and 
USDA ERS 2009). 
In response to this healthcare disparity, federal and state programs have been 
established to incentivize healthcare providers to practice in geographic regions that have 
been identified as having a shortage of primary care, dental, and mental healthcare 
providers. Over 60 million Americans live in a shortage area for primary care, nearly 50 
million live in a shortage area for dental care and nearly 100 million live in a shortage 
area for mental health (U.S. DHHS 2016). At the federal level, these shortage areas are 
called Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs) and can be geographic areas, 
population groups, or facilities in which the number of healthcare providers falls beneath 
a designated target. Nationally, over half of HPSA designations are in nonmetropolitan 
counties, while in Nebraska, over 85 percent of the designations are in nonmetropolitan 
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counties (U.S. DHHS 2016)1. Additionally, the State of Nebraska designates counties as 
state-designated shortage areas to further identify healthcare provider needs within the 
state. 
Being designated a shortage area makes these areas eligible to benefit from 
programs that incentivize providers to practice there. In Nebraska, two incentive 
programs are administered from state funds, 1) the Nebraska Student Loan Program 
(SLP), and 2) the Nebraska Loan Repayment Program (LRP). Although both programs 
exist to help alleviate the healthcare disparity found in nonmetropolitan areas, the 
programs have important differences in the structure and timing of healthcare providers’ 
decision to commit to serve in a state-designated shortage area in return for the incentive.  
Under the SLP, the state awards forgivable student loans to medical, physician 
assistant, dental, and graduate-level mental health students who agree to practice one year 
in a state-designated shortage area for every year they accept the forgivable loan. This 
incentive is received while participants are in professional school. Under the LRP, 
licensed physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, dentists, pharmacists, 
occupational and physical therapists, and mental healthcare providers receive funds to 
pay back student loans over the course of three years once they begin to practice in a 
state-designated shortage area. Both programs require that participants practice in a state-
designated shortage area for a certain period of time in exchange for the financial 
incentive (NE DHHS 2015a). Both the SLP and LRP have experienced financial and 
administrative changes over time. These changes include increased monetary incentives, 
changes to the cost of defaulting—that is, not completing one’s practice obligation in a 																																																								
1Healthcare facilities in metropolitan areas may also be designated a Health Professional 
Shortage Area and may be eligible to receive state and federal funds. 
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shortage area—as well as sending service obligation reminders to participants of the SLP. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the differences between the programs and changes in the programs 
over time. 
Previous studies have found differences in outcomes between student-targeted 
and professional-targeted incentive programs. In this particular study, since its inception 
in 1979, nearly 45 percent of SLP participants have failed to complete their practice 
obligation, compared to only eight percent of LRP participants. This difference in 
completion rate, given the structural differences of the programs, may be partially 
explained by a behavioral economic concept known as projection bias. Projection bias 
refers to an individual’s tendency to exaggerate the degree to which their future 
preferences reflect their current preferences (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 
2003). In these incentive programs, the differences in timing of the decision to participate 
in a program may lead to a higher probability of projection bias in the SLP compared to 
the LRP. In the SLP, individuals commit to practicing in a state-designated shortage area 
while attending school in exchange for a forgivable student loan. In this program, an 
individual must predict their future preferences years in advance (up to seven years in the 
case of a medical student), compared to LRP participants, who receive the incentive once 
they are practicing and make their decision to participate a year or two before they begin 
practice in a shortage area.  
Other program design features may also contribute to the likelihood of individuals 
exhibiting projection bias. For example, changes to the cost of default may influence the 
perception of how costly or binding their decision to participate is. If the cost of 
defaulting changes, it is possible that individuals will spend more time considering their 
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true future practice preferences in order to make more accurate predictions, decreasing 
the likelihood of defaulting on their obligation. Furthermore, participant characteristics 
such as their background and previous experiences – e.g., whether that person has lived 
in a nonmetropolitan area before or not – may also affect his or her ability to accurately 
predict future preferences (Kahneman and Thaler 2006). 
Projection bias provides a theoretical explanation for the observed differences in 
default rate between the SLP and LRP, and the existence of projection bias would make a 
program that requires individuals to commit to practicing in a shortage area years in 
advance inherently less successful than one that has a shorter time lag between 
committing to a shortage area and carrying out the decision. These differences in 
completion rate suggest that design features of incentive programs should be carefully 
considered in light of projection bias. By understanding what program and personal 
characteristics exacerbate or counteract the magnitude of projection bias, thereby 
affecting the outcomes of financial incentive programs, similar state and federal 
healthcare incentive programs can adapt policies and processes to positively influence the 
success rate of recruiting healthcare providers to serve high need populations. 
1.2 Objectives 
The first objective of this research is to apply a model of projection bias to 
healthcare incentive programs. First, this research proposes an adaptation to the model of 
projection bias by introducing a term that captures variability in individuals’ propensity 
to exhibit projection bias based on the amount of effort an individual expends in 
predicting their future preferences. This modification suggests that the perception of how 
binding a decision is influences the magnitude of projection bias. Next, this project 
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examines how program design features such as the timing of when an incentive is 
received or the cost of default influence one’s likelihood of exhibiting projection bias, 
thereby effecting program outcomes. This objective addresses the influence of projection 
bias on the efficacy of incentive programs created to recruit healthcare providers into 
state-designated shortage areas.  
The second objective of this research is to examine the implications of projection 
bias and program design on the length of service in one’s initial practice location. 
Specifically, this research will observe the length of practice among participants’ initial 
shortage area practice locations and discuss which individual and program design 
variables are most predictive of longer retention of healthcare providers.  
1.3. Contribution to the Literature 
This research contributes to literature in the behavioral economics and rural health 
fields. First, this thesis extends the theory of projection bias by introducing a variable 
expected to influence the magnitude of bias exhibited by individuals. Additionally, it 
proposes that program design can induce or reduce the occurrence of projection bias, 
demonstrating that structural features of programs may influence the quality of decisions 
individuals make. While the effectiveness of healthcare financial incentive programs has 
been well researched, this analysis applies behavioral economic principles to describe 
why similar programs experience different outcomes. Looking at financial incentive 
programs through the lens of behavioral economics provides a new perspective and 
potential strategies to improve program outcomes. 
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1.4 Definition of Rural 
Because the majority of healthcare shortage areas in Nebraska are in places that 
would be considered “rural,” it is important to establish a precise definition of the term 
that will be used throughout this thesis. Although several definitions of rural exist, the 
key dimension of rural is geographic dispersion of population and lesser access to 
markets for services and jobs (USDA ERS 2009). This research utilized the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB) county-based metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
classification because this definition is used extensively at the federal level for healthcare 
policy, including programs designed to increase healthcare providers in rural areas (Hart, 
Larson and Lischner 2005). 
As of 2013, the OMB defined metropolitan (metro) counties as broad labor-
market areas that include central locations with one or more urbanized core – i.e., cities 
with a population greater than or equal to 50,000 – and outlying counties that are 
economically tied to the core, as measured by labor-force commuting. Nonmetropolitan 
(nonmetro) counties are outside the boundaries of metro areas and are further subdivided 
into two types. Micropolitan (micro) areas are nonmetro labor-market areas centered on 
populations between 10,000-49,999 and outlying counties that are economically tied to 
the core. Noncore counties are all remaining nonmetro counties because they are not part 
of the “core-based” metro or micro areas (U.S. OMB 2013). Based on these definitions, 
the State of Nebraska has 13 metropolitan, 17 micropolitan, and 63 noncore counties as 
of 2013 (U.S. OMB 2013). 
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1.5 Description of Incentive Programs 
The State of Nebraska’s Department of Health and Human Services, Office of 
Rural Health designates state shortage areas every three years. These designations are 
based on a variety of variables including physician-to-population ratio, proportion of 
elderly population, proportion of population below the poverty level, health indicators 
such as infant mortality rate and low birth rate, and the age of existing healthcare 
workforce in the geographic region (NE DHHS 2015b). Descriptions of the SLP and LRP 
incentive programs that are funded and administered by the State of Nebraska are 
outlined below. A summary of this information can be found in Table 1.1. 
1.5.1 Incentive Amounts and Eligible Recipients 
Under the SLP, the state awards forgivable student loans to Nebraska medical, 
physician assistant, dental, and graduate-level mental health students who agree to 
practice for one year in an approved specialty, state-designated shortage area for every 
year they accept the incentive. The nominal incentive amount has changed over time. 
This program started in 1979 by awarding low-interest loans to medical students. In 
1991, the program switched from providing low-interest loans to forgivable student loans 
to Nebraska medical and physician assistant students in the amount of $10,000 and 
$5,000 per year, respectively. In 1998, the nominal incentive value increased and more 
professions became eligible. The SLP awarded forgivable student loans in the amount of 
$20,000 to Nebraska medical and dental students, and $10,000 to physician assistant and 
master’s level mental health students (NE DHHS 2015a).  
The LRP is available to physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants 
practicing in primary care specialties – e.g., family practice, general internal medicine, 
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general pediatrics, obstetrics/gynecology, general surgery, and psychiatry – dentists, 
clinical psychologists, licensed mental health practitioners, pharmacists, occupational 
therapists, and physical therapists. Under the LRP, participating healthcare providers 
receive funds, provided from a 50-50 state and local match, to pay back student loans for 
three years once they begin to practice in a state-designated shortage area. Beginning in 
1994, primary care physicians, dentists, and psychologists received up to $20,000 per 
year for three years, and nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and master's level 
mental health professionals received up to a $10,000 per year for three years. Dentists, 
pharmacists, and occupational and physical therapists were added to program eligibility 
in 1998. In 2006, the per-year incentive increased to $40,000 and $20,000, respectively. 
These funds require the recipient to complete a three-year practice obligation in a state-
designated shortage area (NE DHHS 2015a).  
1.5.2 Timing of Incentive Received 
One important distinction between these two programs is the timing of the 
delivery of the incentive. In the SLP, individuals receive the incentive while in 
professional school, and by participating, agree to practice in a state-designated shortage 
area years before they are licensed to practice. LRP participants receive the incentive 
once they are licensed and a practicing professional. LRP participants choose to 
participate in the program towards the end of their training and typically make the 
decision to participate in this program a year or two before beginning practice in shortage 
area. 
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1.5.3 Default Cost and Administrative Changes 
Failure to practice in a state-designated shortage area for the time required of 
these incentive programs results in a default outcome. Default may occur prior to 
practicing in a shortage area, in the case of the SLP, or it may occur after beginning 
practice in a shortage area if an individual moves practice locations prior to completing 
the time required of the obligation.  
Failure to complete a practice obligation comes at a financial cost to the program 
participant. While the cost of default under the LRP has remained constant over time for 
the sample in the study – 125 percent of funds received – the SLP has implemented 
administrative and default cost changes over time. Prior to 1998, in default condition one 
(DC1), the cost of default was 24 percent simple interest from the date the incentive was 
received. Administrative changes were made in 1998, which marks the beginning of 
default condition two (DC2). At this time, SLP participants began receiving semi-annual 
letters reminding them of their practice obligation to the State of Nebraska and the cost to 
the individuals if they defaulted on their obligation. Participants received these letters 
twice a year until their obligation was completed. The default cost remained at 24 percent 
simple interest from the date the incentive was received. In 2007, the beginning of default 
condition three (DC3), the default cost changed to 150 percent principal plus 8 percent 
simple interest from the date of default. The semi-annual letters continued in this 
condition (NE DHHS 2015a). 
1.6 Organization of Work 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature regarding the efficacy of healthcare 
financial incentive programs at recruiting and retaining healthcare providers in shortage 
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areas. Additionally, this chapter discusses the influence of projection bias on economic 
and medical decisions and what may cause projection bias among financial incentive 
programs. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework of projection bias as it relates to 
healthcare financial incentive programs and proposes a modification to the model of 
simple projection bias. This chapter also derives hypotheses of variables expected to be 
influenced by projection bias. Chapter 4 discusses the sample used in this research and 
provides summary statistics of the data. The empirical models – i.e., probit model and 
survival analysis models including a Kaplain-Meier survival probability and cox 
proportional hazards regression – used to test hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 provides results and discussion of the analysis, and a summary of this research 
is discussed in Chapter 7.   
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Table 1.1 
    Nebraska Rural Health Incentive Program Descriptions 
 
 Student Loan (SLP) Loan Repayment (LRP) 
Timing of Incentive Received as student 
 
Received as licensed 
professional 
 
Practice Obligation One year service per year 
incentive received 
 
3-years 
 
Eligible Professions Medical, dental,  
physician assistant, and 
graduate-level mental health 
students 
Physicians, nurse 
practitioners, and physician 
assistants in primary care 
specialties;  
dentists, psychologists,  
licensed mental health 
practitioners,  
pharmacists, occupational 
therapists, and  
physical therapists 
Incentive Amount 
1: 1979-1990 
2: 1991-1997 
3: 1998-2015 
4: 1994-2005 
5: 2006-2015 
Varies by Period: 
1: Low-interest loan 
2: Forgivable Loan  
    (10K, 5K) 
3: Forgivable Loan  
    (20K, 10K) 
 
Varies by Period 
4: 20K, 10K (per year) 
5: 40K, 20K (per year) 
(50-50 state & local match) 
 
Default Cost & 
Administrative 
Oversight2  
1: 1979-1997 
2: 1998-2006 
3: 2007-2015 
4: 1994-2015 
Varies by Period 
1: 24% interest  
2: 24% interest & semi-
annual letter  
3: 150% principal + 8% 
interest & semi-annual 
letter  
 
4:125% funds received 
 
Overall Average 
Default Rate 
43% 8% 
 
																																																								
2 Default cost in the LRP has changed from 125% since 2015, but does not affect the 
sample included in the research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Rural Healthcare Disparities 
The persistent concern about access to healthcare services among vulnerable 
populations, including residents of nonmetropolitan areas, has prompted innovative 
solutions and policy interventions to help address the issue. Some of these efforts include 
utilizing telehealth to extend and improve access to care for those facing geographic 
barriers to healthcare services, a solution particularly useful among the behavioral 
healthcare field (Ricketts 2000); focusing on public health, or population-based 
preventive approaches that address systematic factors influencing health of a population 
such as diabetes, mental health, or use of tobacco (Hartley 2004); training a diverse 
workforce of those most likely to practice among underserved populations (Jackson and 
Gracia 2014); exposing students to underserved populations by working in free clinics 
while in training (VanderWielen et al. 2015); and incentivizing healthcare providers to 
practice in healthcare provider shortage areas by relieving debt incurred during training. 
Expanding programs or creating new interventions such as the examples above is 
becoming even more important as the demand for healthcare services continues to grow. 
Petterson et al. (2012) estimate that the U.S. will require almost 52,000 additional 
primary care physicians by 2025 to meet future demand. This estimate is calculated by 
accounting for the number of primary care office visits, U.S. Census Bureau population 
and demographic change projections, and the current supply of primary care providers 
according to the American Medical Association Masterfile (Petterson et al. 2012). 
Population growth is the key driver of growing demand for healthcare, followed by an 
aging population as well as an expected increase in demand due to expanded medical 
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coverage through the Affordable Care Act (Petterson et. al 2012 and IHS Inc. 2015). 
These estimates, however, do not consider the geographic distribution of healthcare 
providers, and the key drivers of demand will exacerbate the geographic health disparities 
if population growth, newly insured, or aging residents are clustered in areas already 
experiencing shortages of healthcare providers (Petterson et al. 2012).  
One strategy to increase the number of providers in shortage areas is to offer 
financial incentives. Two common incentives include student- and professional-targeted 
programs. Student-targeted programs involve incentives such as low-interest or 
forgivable educational loans or scholarships. In these programs, students commit early in 
their healthcare education to practice in a designated shortage area upon completion of 
training in exchange for the incentive. Alternatively, in professional-targeted programs, 
participants commit near the completion of their training to practice in a designated 
shortage area in exchange for assistance in repaying educational loans acquired earlier as 
students (Bärnighausen and Bloom 2009a).  
Through these programs, participating healthcare providers enter into a legally 
binding contract to work for a specified number of years in a medically underserved area 
in exchange for a financial pay-off (Bärnighausen and Bloom 2009a). Incentive programs 
vary by the amount of financial incentive received, penalty for defaulting on the contract, 
the timing of when the incentive is received, type of commitment, and professions 
eligible to participate (Bärnighausen and Bloom 2009b). 
Efforts like these to increase the supply of, or redistribute, healthcare providers in 
order to increase access and quality of care requires that policy-makers understand the 
economic and psychological forces at play when individuals face decisions of where to 
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practice. Increasing the value of practicing in an underserved area by increasing the 
monetary payoff for doing so by providing financial incentives may help correct for the 
misdistribution. However, there are additional psychological factors that are likely to 
influence the outcome of programs that are intended to recruit professionals to areas in 
need of healthcare professionals. Looking at the issue of healthcare disparities through 
the lens of behavioral economics could provide new insights into the way that healthcare 
financial incentive programs are designed and delivered. 
2.2 Behavioral Economics 
The field of behavioral economics seeks to improve upon theoretical frameworks 
of neoclassical economics by incorporating psychological foundations to make better 
predictions of behavior (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). An assumption of neoclassical 
economics is that individuals are rational, utility-maximizing agents. However, in certain 
instances, individuals tend to exhibit irrational behaviors that are not accounted for in 
neoclassical models. For example, one’s attitude towards risk is influenced by a reference 
point and framing, resulting in risk-aversion when facing gains and risk seeking when 
facing losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Behavioral economics begins with rational 
agent models and introduces cognitive limitations of humans to more accurately explain 
and predict behavior. Behavioral economic insights can help explain common findings 
and outcomes of financial incentive programs by investigating how program design 
features may unintentionally induce biases—such as projection bias—that undermine the 
effectiveness of the program. 
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2.2.1 Projection Bias 
To correctly make intertemporal decisions, individuals must know how their 
tastes will change over time. While neoclassical economic models assume individuals 
understand the distribution of their changes in taste, projection bias suggests that while 
individuals may be able to anticipate the direction of their changes in preferences–e.g., 
eating appetizers will diminish one’s appetite for dinner or winning the lottery will 
improve one’s quality of life–individuals systematically misestimate the magnitude of 
these changes (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). This is known as projection 
bias, or the tendency to exaggerate the degree to which one’s future preferences reflect 
current preferences (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). For example, one may 
schedule an overly warm summer vacation destination if planning the vacation during the 
winter, or a healthy individual may overestimate the impact that being diagnosed with a 
chronic disease will have on their quality of life. Current preferences are dependent upon 
a number of factors including mood, environment, habits, or previous experiences, and 
empirical studies have found that individuals systematically misestimate how their tastes 
and preferences will change when their psychological state, mood, or environment 
change (Loewenstein 2000; Grable, Lytton and O’Neill 2004; Lucey and Dowling 2005). 
 The inability to anticipate how one’s preferences will change undermines the 
quality of decisions that individuals make (Loewenstein 2005). Projection bias has been 
shown to influence behavior in a variety of domains, including the medical field (Slevin 
et al. 1988, Bernabei et al. 1998, Loewenstein 2005, and Halpern and Arnold 2008). A 
study by Slevin et al. (1988) found that individuals in a state of health inaccurately 
predicted what their treatment preferences would be after becoming ill. More specifically, 
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the researchers found that patients with cancer were much more likely to opt for radical 
medical treatment, even with a small chance of benefit, compared to healthy non-patients. 
Only 10 percent of healthy non-patients said they would accept a grueling treatment of 
chemotherapy to extend their life by three months, compared to 42 percent of cancer 
patients. Moorman and Carr (2008) studied elderly spouses’ hypothetical end-of-life 
treatment decisions for their incapacitated spouses. Results showed that surrogate 
spouses– i.e., those making treatment decision that they believed their incapacitated 
spouses would choose– accurately predicted the incapacitated spouses’ true treatment 
preferences between 62% and 77% of the time, demonstrating that projection bias also 
exists between individuals in different states. 
Projection bias has also been found to influence economic decisions. A study by 
Grable, Lytton and O’Neill (2010) found that the previous week’s closing prices, 
influenced by short-term price changes, changed investors’ risk tolerance attitudes the 
subsequent week. Based on psychological evidence, Loewenstein et al. (2001) and Lucey 
and Dowling (2005) proposed that one’s feelings or mood drives financial decisions 
involving uncertainty, and Lo, Repin, and Steenbarger (2005) found that trader’s who 
exhibit intense emotional reactions to market events such as price volatility performed 
worse than those who had lesser emotional reactions, indicating that one’s emotional 
state influences decisions made in that state. Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 
(2003) demonstrated how projection bias could cause individuals to consume too much 
early in life and too little later in life. The authors also proposed that projection bias could 
cause misguided purchases of durable goods. For instance, people’s valuation of durable 
goods fluctuate daily, and projection bias would suggest that individuals will over-
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purchase durable goods on high-valuation days.  
2.3 Recruitment Efficacy of Incentive Programs 
Current literature addresses the effectiveness of financial incentive programs in 
both recruiting and retaining healthcare providers in high need communities. The 
effectiveness of financial incentive programs varies and depends on many factors like 
design elements of the programs, including length of time between commitment and 
service, the length of service commitment, freedom in choosing practice location, as well 
as expectations about quality of life during the service commitment and the mission of 
the work involved (Miller and Crittenden 2001). 
Jackson et al. (2003) found that state programs that recruit students had 
significantly lower recruitment success than state programs that recruit healthcare 
workers after their training. Pathman et al. (2004) support this finding through a study of 
state-funded healthcare incentive programs, reporting that student-targeted programs that 
obligate students to practice in shortage areas early in their training have the lowest 
completion rates, ranging from 44 percent to 66.5 percent. However, programs that 
recruit providers towards the end of their training have a completion rate of 92 percent 
(Pathman et al. 2004), confirming that recruiting participants closer to the end of their 
training, or closer to the time of starting practice, will result in higher completion rates.  
2.3.1 Projection Bias and Financial Incentive Programs 
The differences in completion rates among programs that require commitment 
near the beginning of training versus those that require commitment shortly before 
individuals begin practicing may be explained by projection bias. The differences in 
timing of the decision to participate between student-targeted and professional-targeted 
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programs may lead to a greater likelihood of projection bias among student-targeted 
programs. It is likely that students participating in student-targeted incentive programs 
believe that their preferences for primary care specialties (or other professions eligible to 
receive funds) and for working in a nonmetropolitan, underserved community will be the 
same upon completion of their training. However, individuals may fail to account for 
how their preferences may change over the course of several years and are more likely to 
exhibit biased predictions of their future tastes the further into the future they are 
predicting. 
2.4 Relevant Causes of Projection Bias  
2.4.1 Insensitivity to Temporal Location 
Increasing the length of time between making a decision and experiencing the 
consequences of that decision contributes to a higher probability of projection bias. 
People do not always know what their preferences will be in the future, because it is 
cognitively demanding for people to imagine their tastes, and individuals are likely to 
make the most incorrect predictions about their future tastes when the temporal gap is 
long (Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Individuals create mental representations of future 
events, called simulations, in order to imagine consequences about an event that has not 
yet occurred (Gilbert and Wilson 2007). People use their immediate reactions to these 
simulations to predict their reactions or preferences when the event comes about. 
However, errors in prospection occur because not all features of an experience are 
included in the simulation, even though some of these excluded features may have a 
profound impact on the future experience. For example, a young couple that imagines the 
joy of owning their own home but fails to imagine the burden of home repair or yard 
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upkeep may overestimate how much they will enjoy home ownership. The tendency of 
individuals to neglect certain features of an event increases as the event becomes more 
temporally distant (Gilbert and Wilson 2007).  
Imagining individual preferences months or years into the future increases the 
probability that an error in prediction will occur. Gilbert, Gill and Wilson (2002) suggest 
that people consider the temporal location of events only after first imagining the events 
happening in the present. Because individuals are insensitive to length of time, 
predictions of future preferences and associated utility are strongly anchored on present 
states.  
2.4.2 Salience of Outcome Attributes 
Anchoring to preferences in the present psychological state causes errors of 
predicted preferences if one aspect of an outcome is salient at the time the decision is 
made but a different aspect is prominent when the decision is experienced (Kahneman 
and Thaler 2006). For example, when purchasing a gym membership, the health benefits 
of exercising are salient at the time of purchase, but when making the decision of whether 
or not to exercise at the gym, other factors such as time constraints or level of motivation 
may be more influential in deciding whether or not to actually exercise. Forecasts about 
future preferences that are based on some attribute of an outcome, such as health, are 
likely to be incorrect if the same attribute is not focused on at the point in time in the 
future when the decision is being carried out. 
If, for example, the attribute of receiving a significant financial incentive in the 
near future is salient when agreeing to participate in the SLP, but is no longer salient in 
the future when making practice location decisions, it is more likely that the provider will 
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default on their obligation. In the LRP, the incentive is more likely to be salient when 
recipients carry out their obligation, as it’s received during the contract fulfillment. 
Ensuring that the benefits and costs of participation are considered when enrolling and 
carrying out service obligations has potential to decrease projection bias. 
2.4.3 Underappreciating Adaptation 
In addition to underappreciating how one’s preferences will change when his or 
her visceral state – i.e., hunger, anger, cravings – changes, individuals also underestimate 
their ability to adapt to major life events. This misestimation of how one adapts can cause 
bias in predicted preferences or quality of life expectations. Psychological research 
consistently shows that individuals underestimate their ability to adapt to adversity 
(Halpern and Arnold 2008). Gilbert et al. (1998) examined a variety of situations where 
individuals overestimated the duration and intensity of their reaction to negative events. 
Assistant professors overestimated the impact that approval or denial of tenure would 
have on their life (after comparing to reports of former assistant professors), patients on a 
kidney transplant list overestimated the impact of denial or approval of an organ 
transplant, and students who had yet to experience a romantic break-up anticipated their 
sadness would last longer than what was reported by those who had experienced a 
romantic break-up. Similar results were found in situations for job seekers being rejected 
by a potential employer, losing a political election, and receiving negative feedback, 
suggesting that individuals overestimate the length of their reaction to adverse events 
(Gilbert et al. 1998). In general, individuals have biased expectations about the duration 
and intensity of emotions due to underappreciating the ability to adapt with time.  
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Adaptation is the process of adjusting to new or changed circumstances, and can 
include cognitive adaptation, such as changes in goals or interests (Dolan and Kahneman 
2008). In the case of healthcare financial incentive programs, individuals may 
underappreciate how their interests in various specialties or preferences for practice 
locations will change over time as they encounter new experiences. However, prompting 
individuals to more carefully consider their future preferences may reduce projection 
bias. 
In emotional adaptation experiments conducted by Ubel, Loewenstein and Jepson 
(2005), the researchers asked participants to estimate their quality of life associated with 
paraplegia before and after an adaptation exercise. They found that asking individuals to 
reflect on how they would adapt to becoming paraplegic over time led to increased–and 
less biased–quality of life estimates. Further, results indicated that the greater attention 
drawn to the process of adaptation, the greater the impact the adaptation exercise had on 
individual responses. 
2.5 Program Design Elements 
Some incentive programs have stipulations to increase the likelihood of 
completing service obligations, such as hefty financial penalties for defaulting. 
Bärnighausen and Bloom (2009a) determined that the proportion of participants who 
fulfilled their service obligation did not differ significantly between programs that did 
impose a cost for defaulting and those that did not. The authors suggest that this indicates 
participants who default on their obligation make the decision to do so independently of 
the conditions of the program they are enrolled in. However, contrary to this finding, 
Pathman et al. (2004) found that the cost of buyout among student-targeted incentive 
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programs was related to completion rates. The researchers report that very high default 
costs appear to cut default rates by one-third (Pathman et al. 2004a). Student-targeted 
programs experienced 80 percent completion rates by charging penalties three times the 
amount of support provided, compared to less than 50 percent completion rates for the 
programs with lesser default penalties. Although default costs appear to decrease default 
rates among student-targeted programs, these costs were also associated with lower 
satisfaction and shorter retention. While the researchers did not examine the influence of 
changing default costs within programs, Pathman et al. (2004a) found no relationship 
between completion rates and default cost within loan repayment programs.  
Additional strategies to increase the probability of program completion include 
targeting individual characteristics for recruitment. One commonly used strategy is to 
select program candidates based on characteristics believed to be associated with a high 
probability of completing service obligations. There is strong evidence that healthcare 
providers from nonmetropolitan, or shortage area, backgrounds are more likely to choose 
to practice in these areas compared to their urban peers (Daniels et al. 2007 and 
Rabinowitz et al. 2001), and Hensel et al. (2007) estimated that nonmetro physicians are 
four to five times more likely to have grown up in a nonmetro community compared to 
physicians with a metropolitan background. Additionally, individuals with a 
nonmetropolitan upbringing who participate in incentive programs may be less likely to 
exhibit projection bias, resulting in higher completion rates, as they are more easily able 
to model their future preferences for living in a shortage area compared to an individual 
who has not lived in a rural area. Gilbert and Wilson (2007) support this claim, stating 
that memories are the building blocks of simulating one’s reaction to future events. 
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In a study conducted at the University of Kentucky College of Medicine, 
researchers reported that the strongest predictor of student interest in nonmetropolitan 
practice locations was a positive opinion of the quality of life in these areas (Curran and 
Rourke 2004). Curran and Rourke (2004) discussed that opinion and attitude about life in 
nonmetro areas can be influenced by experiences of growing up in nonmetro areas, 
frequent exposure to practicing in these settings while in medical training, and 
encouragement from faculty and institutions to pursue primary care related fields.  
2.6 Retention 
Service-requiring programs aid in recruiting healthcare providers into underserved 
regions, but to reduce the long-term prevalence of these healthcare disparities it is 
important for providers to remain practicing in these areas. The proportion of service-
requiring program participants who remained in underserved areas after completing their 
obligation3 ranged from 12 percent to 90 percent across eighteen retention studies 
reviewed by Bärnighausen and Bloom (2009a). The longest retention by program type 
was held by loan repayment participants—nearly 80 percent remained in their service site 
five years after beginning service, and 66 percent remained after eight years. Shorter 
retention was found for scholarship participants, with around 50 percent remaining in 
their service site five years after starting work there (Pathman et al. 2004b). 
Research demonstrated that participants in financial incentive programs were less 
likely than non-participants to remain in their first underserved practice area (Pathman, 
Konrad, and Ricketts 1992; Pathman, Konrad, and Ricketts 1994). However, participants 
																																																								3	The length of obligation and definition of retention varies across programs. Therefore, 
the percentages reported indicate the proportion of participants who remained in their 
service obligation location beyond the time stipulated by their contract.	
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were more likely to practice in some underserved area or to work with an underserved 
population compared to their non-participating peers over the long run (Bärnighausen and 
Bloom 2009a). The literature discusses many factors that contribute to heightened 
retention, such as workplace fit, community satisfaction, and familial satisfaction. Studies 
have found that demographics and backgrounds of incentive program participants are not 
related to how satisfied they are in a nonmetro or underserved area, or how long they 
remain practicing in their initial shortage area (Singer et al. 1998 and Pathman et al. 
2004). 
These findings suggest that the types of incentives used to retain doctors in 
underserved areas may differ from incentives designed to recruit them (Buykx et al. 
2010). Li et al. (2014) conducted choice experiments among nonmetropolitan general 
practitioners in Australia and found that increasing the availability of a substitute general 
practitioner would have the largest impact in improving retention of physicians in 
isolated areas, followed by increased retention payments and additional compensation for 
complex services and geographic isolation from specialists.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A fundamental assumption of neoclassical economics is that individuals are 
rational beings who make choices that maximize utility. However, findings from 
behavioral economic research provides evidence that individuals do not always make 
decisions that yield maximized utility over time, in part because they fail to consider or 
accurately predict what their tastes and preferences will be in the future, and instead rely 
heavily on current emotions or recent events in making decisions (Hsee and Hastie 2006).  
Standard economic theory requires that individuals know the distribution of their 
preferences throughout time, yet behavioral economic evidence suggests otherwise. For 
example, hungry shoppers are more likely to purchase high-calorie foods compared to 
satiated shoppers (Tal and Wansink 2013); individuals are more likely to return warm 
clothing if the items were ordered on a day that was colder than when the items were 
received (Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang 2007); and many purchasers of annual 
gym memberships quit going to the gym within a few months (Della Vigna and 
Malmendier 2006). These examples demonstrate that preferences change and that 
individuals imperfectly predict their changing preferences. Psychological evidence 
supports that individuals understand qualitatively the direction of their changes in 
preferences – e.g., being diagnosed with a chronic illness will decrease one’s quality of 
life – but individuals systematically misestimate the magnitude of these changes 
(Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978; Gilbert et al. 1998; Ubel, Loewenstein, and 
Jepson 2005). 
Failure to accurately predict future preferences undermines the quality of 
decisions that people make (Loewenstein 2005), and may have serious health and 
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economic implications. The existing literature discusses the causes of projection bias and 
identifies its prevalence across economic decisions and domains. Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) have developed a model of simple projection bias, and 
this chapter proposes an adaptation to this model by introducing a term expected to 
decrease individuals’ propensity to exhibit projection bias. Additionally, this chapter 
presents hypotheses about projection bias in the context of the incentive programs and 
discusses which variables within this analysis are expected to be related to projection bias 
among participants of healthcare financial incentive programs.   
3.1 Rationale for Modifying Simple Model of Projection Bias 
 
Figure 3.1: Timeline for Decisions 
The general decision timeline for participating in the SLP or LRP and for 
completing service obligations is described in Figure 3.1. The length of time between 
each decision point is representative of an average medical student or licensed physician. 
Upon entering professional school at time period A, individuals can choose to participate 
in the SLP program in exchange for practicing in a shortage area beginning at time period 
C. During the latter part of training, participants face the decision to participate in the 
LRP at time period B. At point D, participants will have completed their service-
obligation. If participants fail to practice in a shortage area for the length of time required 
by their contract, illustrated as the length of time between periods C and D, they incur a 
		 	 27	
default cost, c. This cost depends upon the default cost condition imposed during their 
participation.  
The objective of healthcare financial incentive programs is to recruit healthcare 
providers to practice in areas with a low provider-to-population ratio. Thus, having 
participants fulfill their practice obligation – i.e., reach point D on the timeline in Figure 
3.1 – is the desired outcome of such programs. Because participants choose to participate 
in these programs at point A or B and do not experience the consequences of their 
decision until point C, it is important to consider how their preferences may change over 
time, and how these changes influences the likelihood of a completed program outcome. 
In order to increase the likelihood of a completed program outcome, reducing the 
propensity of projection bias exhibited among participants should help reach this desired 
outcome. I expect that projection bias is higher when a decision is perceived to be less 
binding because one would expect individuals to spend less time and cognitive resources 
considering the consequences of their decisions when there is no or little cost to being 
wrong. Alternatively, I expect the magnitude of projection bias to decrease when a 
decision is perceived to be more binding, encouraging individuals to carefully consider 
their future preferences. Ubel, Loewenstein and Jepson (2005) found that prompting 
individuals to think about how they adapt to changes over time led to a reduction in bias, 
indicating that the more individuals are prompted to consider how their preferences will 
change over time, the less likely they are to make biased predictions regarding their 
future. 
I propose that both monetary and non-monetary program elements can affect the 
probability that projection bias occurs. The cost of defaulting on a practice obligation 
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may influence the likelihood of projection bias occurring by encouraging individuals to 
devote more effort to predicting future preferences. Regular reminders of practice 
obligations from program administrators are likely to maintain the salience of incentive 
attributes. The SLP generated three different default cost conditions where some 
participants faced higher default costs than others (see Table 1.1). I anticipate that the 
default cost, along with receiving letters reminding participants of their service 
obligation, contributes to the perception of how binding it is to participate in these 
financial incentive programs. I propose that the more costly it becomes to mispredict 
one’s future preferences, or the more bound one feels to fulfilling their obligation, the 
less likely they are to exhibit projection bias and default on their obligation. Therefore, 
the perception of how binding the choice to participate in an incentive program is will 
affect the occurrence of projection bias among participants. I therefore propose an 
adaptation to the model of projection bias to include a variable that captures the perceived 
cost—at the time of the initial decision—of incorrectly predicting one’s future 
preferences. 
3.2 Modified Model of Projection Bias 
The decision to participate in a financial incentive program depends upon how 
much relative utility individuals expect to derive from the decision to participate in the 
incentive program versus not participating. The model of projection bias developed by 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) uses state-dependent utility given by u(cτ, 
sτ), where c is consumption and s is the psychological “state” that parameterizes their 
preferences in period τ. Fully rational individuals are able to correctly predict their future 
preferences and make decisions while in current state s’ that maximize their predicted 
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utility. For individuals who correctly predict their future preferences, predicted utility is 
equal to their true utility, 𝑢(c, s | s’) = u(c, s). Individuals exhibiting projection bias also 
attempt to maximize utility; however, true future utility will differ from current and 
predicted utility due to the influence of projection bias.  
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin’s (2003) model of projection bias posits 
that predicted utility is a weighted combination of true future utility and current utility 
using weights of α and (1- α), where the magnitude of projection bias is denoted by α. 
Accordingly, there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that for all c, s, and s’, ũ(c, s | s’) = (1 – α) 
u(c, s) + α u(c, s’). Because α is a value between 0 and 1, predicted utility will fall 
somewhere between current utility and true utility in the future. If α = 0, individuals 
predict their future preferences accurately and no projection bias occurs. When α = 1, 
individuals predict that their future preferences are identical to current preferences. As α 
tends to 1, more projection bias occurs.  
I propose that a binding variable, β, which represents how binding a decision is 
perceived to be, will influence the magnitude of projection bias, represented by α, by 
affecting the cognitive resources invested in envisioning future preferences. Thus, the 
projection bias parameter is a function of how binding the decision is—α(β)—where 
α'<0. With this adaptation, predicted utility in the presence of projection bias is now 
denoted by 
ũ(c, s | s’) = (1 – α(β)) u(c,s) + α(β) u(c,s’).  (1) 
For the utility derived from healthcare financial incentive programs, I propose that 
utility is a function of the value of incentive received described by 𝜇, the perceived utility 
of practicing in a designated shortage area described by 𝛾, and the actual utility of 
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practicing in a shortage area described by 𝜀, which is unknown at the time of making a 
participation decision, given a person’s current state, s’. Thus, utility is denoted as 𝑢 𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀  𝑠′). A similar utility function has been used by Conlin, O’Donoghue, and 
Vogelsang (2007) to test the presence of projection bias in catalog orders for cold 
weather clothing. Now, applying the binding variable to the predicted utility model for 
healthcare provider incentive programs, predicted utility is denoted by 
ũ 𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝑠  𝑠′) = (1 – α(β)) u(𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝑠) + α(β) u(𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝑠′).   (2) 
If participants believe their decision to participate is binding, which is a function 
of their default condition, it is likely they will spend more time predicting what their true 
preferences will be for working in a shortage area, decreasing the magnitude of projection 
bias and increasing the likelihood participants will complete their service obligation.4 
After individuals choose whether to participate in the program, the next decision 
of consequence that they make, which is observed in the data, is whether to complete 
their practice obligation. Intuitively, individuals will complete their practice obligation if 
the difference between their ideal practice location, denoted by L* in state s, and their 
current utility from practicing in a shortage area (SA) in state s, is less than the cost, c, 
incurred from defaulting on their contract, described by 
u(L* | s) – u(SA | s)  <  c. (3). 
It is possible for an individual’s ideal practice location to be in a shortage area, in which 
case the left side of the equation would equal zero. This equation suggests that even if a 
																																																								4	Embedding this model into an intertemporal choice scenario was considered. However, 
because there is a delay in receiving the incentive in both programs, it is unlikely that 
individuals are exhibiting quasi-hyperbolic discounting that would result in a preference 
reversal in one program but not the other. Therefore, an intertemporal choice model is not 
critical to model decision-making in this situation.  
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shortage area is not one’s ideal practice location preference, if the cost of default is 
greater than the difference in utility between their ideal location and shortage area 
location, they will complete their service obligation.  
Conversely, individuals will default on their practice obligation if the difference 
between their ideal practice location in state s and their current utility from practicing in a 
shortage area in state s is greater than or equal to the cost incurred from defaulting on 
their service obligation, described by 
u(L* | s) – u(SA | s)  ≥  c.  (4) 
If an individual’s ideal location provides a much higher level of utility than the shortage 
area location, it may be preferable to incur the cost of default in order to relocate to their 
preferred location. If great enough differences in the level of utility exist between their 
ideal and shortage area location, individuals are likely to default on their service 
obligation. 
3.3 Hypotheses Derived from Model 
This research seeks to identify variables that contribute to or detract from the 
likelihood of exhibiting projection bias among individuals participating in healthcare 
financial incentive programs. The following hypotheses, derived from the models above, 
discuss what variables I expect to exacerbate or counteract the forces of projection bias in 
healthcare financial incentive programs. 
First, I expect that changes in monetary and non-monetary elements of the default 
conditions will increase participants’ efforts in predicting future preferences and will 
decrease the likelihood of projection bias. Thus, in my first hypothesis (HP1), I expect 
participants in default condition two (DC2) and default condition three (DC3) will be less 
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likely to default on their service obligation because they perceive the commitment to 
participate to be a more binding decision. Since participants in default condition one 
(DC1) did not receive semi-annual reminders, they therefore may have felt that their 
commitment was less binding compared to those who did receive semi-annual letters, 
reminding them of their obligation and the cost of default until their obligation was 
fulfilled. The default condition influences how bound the participant feels to their 
decision to participate, affecting β in equations one and two. Equations three and four 
also suggest that changes to the cost of default, c, may make individuals less likely to 
default on their service obligation, increasing the likelihood of a completed outcome. 
While perceived higher default costs could decrease the number of individuals 
participating in the programs overall, those who do participate after carefully considering 
their future preferences, induced by a more binding contract, are less likely to exhibit 
higher levels of projection bias.  Therefore, I expect that changes to the default cost will 
lead to higher probability of participants completing their service obligations. 
The value of the incentive received is directly related to the utility of participating 
in the SLP and LRP. The nominal value of the incentive has changed over time within 
both programs. While the nominal value changed at specific times in both programs, the 
real value of the incentives has varied in every year. In hypothesis two (H2) I anticipate 
that the higher the incentive value, the greater the magnitude of projection bias and the 
more likely one is to default on their service obligation. If the value of the incentive rises, 
increasing the utility of participating, enrolling in a program may become more enticing 
to individuals who would otherwise be unlikely to consider practicing in a shortage area. 
Higher incentive values may also make this aspect of the program more salient, and the 
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difference in timing of the receipt of benefits may differentially affect continued attribute 
salience in the two programs. In the LRP, program benefits should still be salient while 
they are participating because they receive the benefits at that time, while SLP 
participants’ benefit levels are no longer salient at the time they decide whether or not to 
default. Although increased incentive values may increase the total number of 
participants in the program, I anticipate it will increase the likelihood of projection bias, 
as individuals who may not have a true preference for practicing in shortage areas are 
participating, and are doing so based on the financial incentive it provides5.	
In hypothesis three (H3), I anticipate that participants of incentive programs who 
grew up in nonmetropolitan communities and are more familiar with the realities of 
living in these areas are less likely to exhibit biased projections of their anticipated utility 
for practicing in a nonmetropolitan areas and are therefore less likely to default on their 
service obligation. I make this prediction because choices informed by personal memory 
or experiences are more likely to result in accurate predictions of future preferences 
(Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Alternatively, I expect that participants who grew up in 
larger communities – i.e., micropolitan and metropolitan areas – are more likely to 
exhibit projection bias and default on their service obligations. Individuals with previous 
experiences in shortage area locations, including nonmetropolitan areas, are more likely 
to accurately predict their preferences in their future state, s, resulting in a higher quality 
participation decision. 
																																																								5	A higher incentive value also has the potential to exacerbate present-biased preferences. Individuals who 
exhibit present-biased preferences trade off earlier vs. delayed benefits (or costs) differently depending on 
how immediate the incentive is received. Those who exhibit present-biased preferences give stronger 
relative weight to the earlier benefit as it approaches in time (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Participants 
may experience heightened present-biased preferences by receiving larger monetary incentives. 
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 Within the SLP, I hypothesize (H4) that longer training periods are likely to 
exacerbate projection bias and therefore the probability of default. The greater the 
temporal gap in deciding to participate and carrying out the decision, the greater the 
probability that inaccurate predictions about future preferences are made, and thus, the 
greater the probability of default. Figure 3.1 helps to visualize the time gap between an 
individual’s current state, s’, when they make the decision to participate at points A or B 
and their future state, s, at point C when their service obligation is carried out. Because 
the temporal gap between the decision to participate and carrying out the decision is 
much shorter in the LRP and does not differ among professions, I expect longer training 
periods to only influence projection bias among participants of the SLP.  
Gender could also influence one’s current or future state, and thus has the 
potential to influence one’s predictions of future preferences. There is much media 
attention given to the differences in work and familial roles taken on between men and 
women. The Pew Research Center (2015) reports that women adjust their careers more 
than men to meet familial needs. Additionally, a study by Field and Lennox (1996) found 
that gender affects future career choices and that a cohort of women in medicine 
indicated their career choice is influenced by their desire to have a family in the future. In 
a study concerning gender-related factors in recruiting rural physicians, Ellsbury et al. 
(2002) found that women were significantly more likely than men to attribute more 
importance to opportunities for their partner or spouse, the availability of child-care, and 
flexible scheduling in making practice location decisions. Thus, it is possible that women 
who participate in a financial incentive program may be more likely than men to change 
their original plans of practicing in a shortage area in favor of accommodating a partner’s 
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location preferences or for other familial considerations. Therefore, in hypothesis five 
(H5) I anticipate that men are less likely to exhibit projection bias compared to women, 
as men are less likely to change or adjust their career plans to meet familial needs.  
3.4 Variables Used to Test Hypotheses 
The variables used in this research are common among studies that describe the 
effectiveness of recruitment and retention of healthcare financial incentive programs 
(Rabinowitz et al. 2001; Jackson et al. 2003; Pathman et al. 2004a; Pathman et al. 2004b; 
Daniels et al. 2007). Additionally, these variables capture characteristics of participants 
or the state of the program under which individuals participated to provide insight into 
the state, s’, of participants. 
The default cost condition under which individuals agreed to participate in the 
incentive programs helps to capture how bound a participate may feel to their 
commitment to practice in a shortage area. These conditions are estimated based on the 
incentive program start date and anticipated graduation date articulated in the data. These 
estimates also were used to identify the nominal incentive value individuals received. 
Additionally, the research uses population of the town from which participants 
graduated high school to capture experience in nonmetropolitan areas. The analysis 
categorizes these hometown populations into noncore (populations less than 10,000), 
micropolitan (populations between 10,000 and 50,000), and metropolitan (populations 
greater than 50,000) communities.  
Length of training (LOT) captures the temporal gap between when a participant 
chooses to participate in the SLP or LRP, at points A and B in Figure 3.1, and when the 
decision is actually carried out, represented by point C. Length of training is estimated 
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based on the individual’s career and specialty – e.g., medicine, dentistry, physician 
assistant – and the average length of training, including education and residency training, 
required of the particular career.  
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND DATA 
4.1 Sample 
Panel data were collected from the Health Professions Tracking Service (HPTS), 
an annually updated repository maintained by the College of Public Health at the 
University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC). In operation since 1995, the HPTS 
database maintains Nebraska’s licensed healthcare professionals. It is kept up to date by 
annually surveying Nebraska healthcare providers as well as semi-annually surveying 
practice location administrators. The combined provider and practice location survey 
responses allow the HPTS to link the provider and practice location data in a relational 
database (UNMC Center for Health Policy 2012). The HPTS tracks essential information 
on licensed healthcare providers in Nebraska including profession, specialty 
area, practice locations and dates of practice in each location, city of high school 
graduation, gender, participation in the State of Nebraska Rural Incentive Programs, as 
well as the program outcome – e.g., completed or defaulted. The HPTS works 
collaboratively with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, which 
provided the dataset for this research. 
UNMC’s College of Public Health has compared data from the HPTS to the 
American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile, a database commonly used 
for researching the supply of physicians as well as recruitment and retention rates of 
physicians who have participated in federal or state incentive programs (UNMC Center 
for Health Policy 2012). In a comparison study conducted by UNMC, physician supply 
estimated by the AMA Physician Masterfile is up to 30 percent greater than the supply 
reported by the HPTS. The HPTS is likely to report a more accurate picture of the supply 
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of healthcare providers in Nebraska, as it accounts for hours worked per week and is 
updated annually. 
The sample collected from the HPTS contains 758 observations and includes 
participants from the SLP and LRP. The sample includes 261 individuals who 
participated in the SLP between 1979 and 2015 and 489 who participated in the LRP 
between 1994 and 2015. The summary statistics found in Table 4.1 reflect this sample of 
participants. Additionally, eight individuals participated in both programs, and are not 
included in the SLP and LRP counts. The data encompass all healthcare professions 
eligible to receive funds from the Nebraska Rural Incentive Programs: physicians, nurse 
practitioners, physician assistants, dentists, clinical psychologists, licensed mental health 
practitioners, pharmacists, occupational therapists, and physical therapists. All 
individuals in the dataset are past or current participants of the SLP or LRP who have 
practiced in Nebraska. 
Supplemental data were collected to enhance the information provided by the 
HPTS. Data on Nebraska town populations were imported from the 1970 through 2010 
U.S. Censuses. Additionally, the OMB designations of Nebraska counties were imported 
from the Office of Management and Budget. This information was used in determining 
the population size and the metro- or non-metro- designation of the high school 
graduation city of each program participant, helping to capture the experience or 
familiarity individuals have of living in a non-metro location. Additionally, the OMB 
designation is used to classify the initial shortage area location. Also, because state 
shortage areas are reviewed and adjusted every three years, counties designated as 
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shortage areas over time were imported from the Nebraska Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
To capture the length of time a participant spent in training, I added a length of 
training variable (LOT) that was estimated based on the average length of training 
required for the individual’s profession – e.g., medicine, dentistry, physician assistant – 
and specialty – e.g., family practice, general surgery (All Allied Health Schools 2016; All 
Nursing Schools 2016; American Associations of Colleges of Pharmacy 2016; American 
Dental Education Association 2015; American Physical Therapy Association 2015; 
Careers in Psychology; Physician Assistant Education Association 2013; Washington 
University School of Medicine in St. Louis 2012). LOT includes professional school 
education as well as time spent in residency training.  
To capture the conditions under which individuals participated in the incentive 
programs, I included a categorical default condition (DC) variable and incentive value 
variable. Beginning practice dates and anticipated graduation dates were used to estimate 
what default and incentive value conditions applied to participants when they started the 
program. Table 4.1 provides the number of individuals participating under each default 
and incentive condition. Note that in default condition three in the SLP, approximately 
two-thirds of subjects in this period have yet to reach a program outcome and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. Thus, results regarding this variable may not reflect 
the long-term results of this default condition. 
For both the SLP and LRP, I adjusted nominal incentive values into real values to 
capture the changes in the real value of the incentive, under the assumption that 
individuals received the maximum incentive value in each program per year. The 
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adjusted incentive value (AIV) is the incentive variable used in the analysis. A summary 
of the nominal value of incentives and eligible recipients is summarized in Table 4.2. 
Within the SLP from 1979 to 1990, the incentive was a low-interest loan for medical 
students. Because I am interested in the relative effect of incentive values, I code the 
monetary value of the low-interest loan as zero. While this incentive undoubtedly 
provided positive monetary benefit, I made this specification in order to include these 
participants in the regression, as nearly half of SLP participants participated under this 
incentive condition. Furthermore, SLP participants who received a forgivable student 
loan would have also experienced savings due to foregone interest expenses, which is 
unknown and unaccounted for. Therefore, even after specifying the incentive value as 
zero for SLP participants who received a low-interest loan, the analysis accurately 
compares relative values across incentive conditions.  
The duration of practice (in months) in one’s initial shortage area is also 
calculated based on practice location start and end dates. The data used in the analysis 
only include participants who have completed or defaulted on their service obligation. 
This variable captures the length of time participants remain in their initial shortage area, 
and will be used in the survival analysis. Table 4.4 presents the proportion of initial 
shortage area locations by OMB classifications. Table 4.5 provides the mean and median 
duration of practice in the initial shortage area as well as the standard deviation of SLP 
and LRP participants. 
The sample in this study is limited to participants of the State of Nebraska Rural 
Incentive Programs. Healthcare providers who have participated in federal incentive 
programs, such as the National Health Service Corps, were not included in this study. 
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Additionally, I exclude program participants who have not yet completed or defaulted on 
their obligation. Thus, current students and residents are excluded from the sample 
because they have not yet reached a program outcome of completed or defaulted. 
Similarly, if a participant is licensed and currently practicing under obligation, but has 
not yet arrived at a program outcome, the participant is excluded from the analysis. With 
these exclusions, the sample includes 615 observations, 220 in the SLP and 395 in the 
LRP. 
In the survival analysis, I only include participants who started practice after the 
HPTS began systematically tracking provider practice locations and duration. In other 
words, participants who began practicing prior to 1995, the year the HPTS started 
tracking provider locations, are excluded from this regression. This ensures accuracy of 
the data used in the analysis. Furthermore, recall that the survival analysis only includes 
participants who have reached a completed program outcome. This ensures that the 
length of time spent in one’s initial practice location was a shortage area. With these 
exclusions, the survival analysis sample includes 276 observations. 
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Table 4.1  
      Summary Statistics 
 
 SLP n=261 LRP n=489 
Participants by Default 
Condition 
1: 24% interest (‘79-‘97) 
2: 24% interest & semi-annual 
letter (‘98-’06) 
3: 150% principal + 8% interest & 
semi-annual letter (‘07-’15) 
4: 125% funds received (‘94-’15) 
1: 142; 54.4% 
2: 59; 22.6% 
3: 60; 23.0% 
 
4: 489; 100% 
Participants by Incentive 
Conditions 
1: Low interest loan (’79-’90) 
2: 10K, 5K (‘91-‘98) 
3: 20K, 10K (‘98-‘15) 
4: 20K, 10K (’94-’05) 
5: 40K, 20K (’06,-’15) 
1: 94; 36% 
2: 48; 18.4% 
3: 119; 45.6% 
4: 234; 47.8% 
5: 255; 52.1% 
 
Program Outcomes 
(2 outcomes unknown in SLP) 
Default: 114; 43.7% 
Complete: 106; 40.6%  
In Practice: 16; 6.1%  
In Training: 23; 8.8%  
 
Default: 41; 8.4% 
Complete: 354; 72.3%  
In Practice: 94; 19.2%  
 
Profession 
 
Medicine: 170 
PA: 25 
Dental: 33 
Mental Health: 33 
Medicine: 150 
PA: 116 
NP: 53 
Dental: 26 
Mental Health: 39 
OT: 40 
PT: 31 
Pharmacy: 34 
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Table 4.2  
Nominal Incentive Values and Eligible Recipients 
 
Program Time 
Period 
Nominal 
Incentive Value 
Eligible Recipients 
SLP 1979-1990: 
 
Low-interest loan Medical students  
1991-1997 $10,000 
 
$5,000 
Medical students  
 
Physician assistant students 
1998-2015: $20,000 
 
$10,000 
Medical and dental students 
 
Physician assistant and graduate-level 
mental healthcare students 
LRP 1994-2005 $20,000 
$10,000 
 
Physicians, dentists, psychologists, nurse 
practitioners, physician assistants,  
licensed mental health practitioners,  
pharmacists, occupational therapists, and  
physical therapists 
2006-2015 $40,000 
$20,000 
 
 
Table 4.3 
       Percentage of Initial Service Obligations by OMB Designation 
SA Type  % Of Initial Service 
Obligations 
Metropolitan 4.4% 
Micropolitan 28.8% 
Non core 66.8% 
 
Table 4.4 
Mean and Median Months in Initial Shortage Area by Program Type 
 
Program Type Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
SLP 55.28 37.00 36.79 
LRP 70.47 53.00 52.40 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL MODEL 
5.1 Probit Model  
I use a probit model to analyze participants’ program outcomes. A probit model is 
appropriate because the program outcome variable is binary, or has two possible 
outcomes. Participants either complete or default on their service obligation. The purpose 
of this model is to determine what observable explanatory variables increase the 
probability of a completed program outcome, leading to insight on what variables may 
contribute to or counteract the forces of projection bias. The model considers 
characteristics of the SLP and LRP programs, as well as variables unique to program 
participants. 
The dependent variable is a binary measure of the program outcome, and captures 
whether the participant completed or defaulted on their service obligation. If a participant 
completed their service obligation in the SLP, they practiced in a state-designated 
shortage area for the same number of years they received the incentive. If a LRP 
participant completed their service obligation, they practiced for three years in a state-
designated shortage area. If a participant defaulted on their service obligation, they may 
have defaulted while in school or residency if participating in the SLP, or after spending 
some amount of time in a state-designated shortage area, but less than what is required of 
their obligation in the SLP or LRP. 
I analyze the data for each program separately and then in a pooled analysis. The 
model includes independent variables including default condition (DC), adjusted 
incentive value (AIV), length of training (LOT), gender (male), the categorical 
population of their hometown, and an error term, which is normally distributed in a probit 
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model. The justifications of these variables are discussed in Chapter 3. The probit model 
for this analysis is described by 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛽! +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +   𝛽!∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀. 
It should be noted that in regressions involving the LRP, the default condition 
variable changes to a time period variable, as the default cost remained constant. The 
time periods are reflective of the same time frame as the default conditions in the SLP 
program. Following this time period schedule allows for comparisons between SLP and 
LRP participants who participated during the same time period. 
In the pooled analysis, I include a program type – i.e., SLP – variable. In a second 
variation of the pooled regression, I include interaction terms between the SLP and TP 
and SLP and LOT. These interactions were selected because previous studies suggest the 
temporal gap, which differs between programs, is likely to increase bias, as well as to 
capture the influence of default cost changes over time in the SLP. The interactions allow 
for understanding and comparison of the relationship between the program type and 
variables that are expected to influence the magnitude of projection bias among 
participants. The interacted probit model is described by 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛽! +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +   𝛽!∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽!∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 +  𝛽!∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇 +  𝜀. 
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5.2 Survival Analysis 
I conduct a survival analysis to model the length of time in months spent in the 
initial shortage area location among participants who completed their service obligation. 
Survival analysis is appropriate because it is used to analyze duration data, or how long 
until an event occurs. In this research, the duration measured is the number of months 
spent in one’s initial shortage area location until they exit to a new location. Using a 
Kaplan-Meier survival function, I compare survival probabilities between SLP and LRP 
participants to determine if there is a significant difference in the survival proportion by 
program type. However, a Kaplan-Meier survival function only allows comparison of one 
variable (in this case, program type) and fails to take into account other variables that 
may influence the length of survival in a shortage area, so further analysis must 
accompany these results.    
Next, I conduct a Cox regression analysis to observe associations between 
variables and survival. The dependent variable is the hazard – i.e., the probability of 
leaving the initial shortage area. The predictor variables used in this regression are the 
same as those used in the aggregated probit model – program type, adjusted incentive 
value, time period of participation, LOT, gender, and the categorical variable of 
hometown population. The Cox regression helps distinguish individual contributions of 
these variables on the probability of exiting the initial practice location.  
Conducting a survival analysis provides insight into what variables may influence 
projection bias after entering and practicing in a shortage area location. It is possible that 
individuals exiting their initial shortage area upon completion of their service obligation 
over-estimated their experienced utility of practicing in a shortage area, at least compared 
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to those who remained in their initial location beyond the time required of them. While it 
is possible these participants exited their initial shortage area for a different shortage area, 
the analysis does not test for this.  
Because the survival analysis excludes participants who defaulted on their service 
obligation, or individuals who exhibited early signs of projection bias, it may be more 
difficult to draw conclusions about what variables influencing the hazard of exiting the 
initial location are caused by projection bias, rather than other external determinants of 
retention including family, community, and practice satisfaction. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
6.1 Results 
6.1.1 Probit Model 
Results for the probit model regression for the SLP program are provided in Table 
6.1 Results show that LOT is strongly significant and therefore the longer an individual 
spends in training, the more likely they are to default on their SLP service obligation. 
Additionally, SLP participants in default condition three (DC3) are more likely to default 
on their service obligation, which is significant at the 5 percent level. Participants in 
default condition two (DC2) are less likely to default, although this is not statistically 
significant. While not significant, the gender (male) coefficient is negative indicating that 
males may be less likely than females to default in the SLP. The hometown population 
coefficients are both positive, indicating that those who grew up in a micropolitan or 
metropolitan area are more likely to default on their obligation compared to those whose 
hometown is a nonmetropolitan, noncore area. Overall, the SLP probit model supports 
that longer training periods result in greater likelihood of projection bias (H4). Although 
insignificant, the direction of the coefficients align with hypotheses regarding AIV (H2), 
hometown population (H3), and gender (H5). The prediction that changes to the cost of 
default will decrease default rate (H1) is not strongly supported in this model, as DC3 is 
positive and significant, although DC2 moves in the opposite direction. 
The probit model for LRP uses the same variables as the SLP model, but recall 
that the time period variables now reflect the time frame of the SLP default conditions 
changes, as discussed in Chapter 5. This variable captures any unobserved forces 
influencing default during the different time periods. Results for this model are found in 
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Table 6.2. Significance for time period two (TP2) is found at the 5 percent level. Thus, 
LRP participants from 1998-2006 are less likely to default on their service obligation. 
Note that the gender (male) coefficient is negative in this model and approaching 
marginal significance, lending some support for H5. The remaining variables show no 
significance, which is likely due to differences in LRP program design that reduce the 
likelihood of projection bias. Thus, it is unlikely the any changes made to the structure of 
this program will influence program outcomes in a meaningful way.  
Next, I analyzed the aggregated data on participants of both programs. By 
aggregating the samples, statistical comparisons can be made between the two programs. 
Results for the uninteracted aggregated probit model can be found in Table 6.3. A second 
model interacts the SLP with LOT and time periods two (TP2) and three (TP3). Results 
for the interacted aggregated probit model can be found in Table 6.4.  
Based on the uninteracted model, SLP program participants are significantly more 
likely than LRP participants to default on their service obligation. LOT is marginally 
significant, indicating that the longer the training of an individual in either program, the 
more likely they are to default on their service obligation, supporting H4. The gender 
(male) variable is also slightly significant, suggesting that men are less likely to default 
on their service obligation (H5).  
In the interacted model, the interaction between SLP and LOT shows significance 
at the 1 percent level. This indicates that participants of the SLP with longer training 
periods are more likely to default on their obligation compared to LRP participants of 
similar training length. For example, a dentist in the SLP is more likely to default than a 
dentist in the LRP. The SLP and time period interactions are also significant, suggesting 
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that participants of the SLP program in both TP2 and TP3 are more likely default on their 
service obligation compared to LRP participants of the same time periods. The 
significance in these interactions further support that participants in the SLP are more 
likely to default than those of the LRP. Similar to the uninteracted model, gender (male) 
is marginally significant with a negative coefficient (H5). TP2 is significant at the 5 
percent level, indicating that all incentive program participants between 1998 and 2006 
are less likely to default on their service obligation.  
Table 6.1  
      Probit Model for SLP  
Coefficients Point Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept (β0) -1.336*** 
(0.422) 
0.002 
SLP DC2 (β11) -0.187 
(0.412) 
0.650 
SLP DC3 (β12) 0.9462** 
(0.460) 
0.040 
AIV (β2) 0.00001 
(0.00002) 
0.389 
LOT (β3) 0.187*** 
(0.061) 
0.002 
Male (β4) -0.243 
(0.215) 
0.258    
Hometown Population (β51) 
10,000 – 49,999 
0.404 
(0.369) 
0.274 
Hometown Population (β52) 
50,000 < 
0.334 
(0.423) 
0.429    
AIC 237.97 
       Significance codes:  0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1* 
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Table 6.2  
      Probit Model for LRP  
Coefficients Point Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept (β0) -0.586 
(0.385) 
0.128 
TP2 (β11) 
(1998-2006) 
-0.697**   
(0.304) 
0.022 
TP3 (β12) 
(2007-2015) 
0.201 
(0.352) 
0.569 
AIV (β2) -0.00004  
(0.00002) 
0.140 
LOT (β3) 0.115   
(0.089) 
0.196 
Male (β4) -0.363 
(0.243) 
0.136 
Hometown Population (β51) 
10,000 – 49,999 
-0.040 
(0.302) 
0.896   
Hometown Population (β52) 
50,000 < 
-0.234 
(0.338) 
0.489 
AIC 196.81 
     Significance codes:  0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1* 
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Table 6.3  
Probit Model for Aggregated Data  
Coefficients Point Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept (β0) -1.558*** 
(0.269) 
<0.001 
Program Type: SLP (β1) 1.262*** 
(0.187) 
<0.001 
AIV (β2) -0.000003   
(0.000009) 
0.711 
LOT (β3) 0.073*  
(0.039) 
0.062 
Male (β4) -0.291*   
(0.155) 
0.061 
Hometown Population (β51) 
10,000 – 49,999 
0.101 
(0.220) 
0.647    
Hometown Population (β52) 
50,000 < 
-0.068 
(0.245) 
0.781     
TP2 (1998-2007) (β61) -0.190   
(0.224) 
0.397 
TP3 (2007-2015) (β62) 0.416   
(0.276) 
0.132 
AIC 437.34 
Significance codes:  0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1* 
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Table 6.4 
 Interacted Probit Model for Aggregated Data  
Coefficients Point Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept (β0) -0.893***   
(0.332) 
0.007 
Program Type: SLP (β1) -0.383   
(0.534) 
0.473 
AIV (β2) -0.000003 
(0.00001) 
0.791   
LOT (β3) -0.0006   
(0.060) 
0.992 
Male (β4) -0.303*   
(0.158) 
0.055 
Hometown Population (β51) 
10,000 – 49,999 
0.161   
(0.223) 
0.470   
Hometown Population (β52) 
50,000 < 
-0.023   
(0.250) 
0.927   
TP2 (β61) 
(1998-2006) 
-0.615**   
(0.293) 
0.036 
TP3 (β62) 
(2007-2015) 
-0.051   
(0.307) 
0.869 
SLP * TP2 0.770*   
(0.463) 
0.096 
SLP * TP3 1.192**  
(0.493) 
0.016 
SLP * LOT 0.205***  
(0.078) 
0.008 
AIC 432.05 
Significance codes:  0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1* 
6.1.2 Survival Analysis 
The Kaplain-Meier survival function provides a graphical representation of 
survival probability between participants of the SLP and LRP program in Figure 6.1. 
Approximately 80 percent of participants in the SLP and LRP program remain in their 
initial practice location after 36 months of beginning practice there. With a p-value of 
0.049, the Kaplain-Meier survival function suggests that there are differences in the 
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length of practice in one’s initial practice location based on program type. However, this 
graphical representation is insufficient in determining predictors of the probability of 
exiting the initial shortage area location, as it does not take into account variables beyond 
program type. Thus, a cox hazard regression is conducted.  
 
Figure 6.1: Survival Probability by Program Type 
The results from the cox hazard regression, found in Table 6.5, show that TP2, 
TP3 and the interaction between SLP and TP3 are strongly significant. Additionally, LOT 
is significant at the 5 percent level and metropolitan hometown variable is marginally 
significant. The coefficient for TP2 and TP3 is positive, indicating that the probability of 
these participants exiting their initial shortage area increases, and that these participants 
are more likely to exit than those in TP1. For example, the hazard ratio for TP2 is 2.47. A 
hazard ratio greater than one indicates that participants of TP2 are exiting their shortage 
area faster than participants of TP1. The same is true for participants in TP3. 
Additionally, the coefficient for the interaction term between the SLP and TP3 is greater 
than one, indicating that participants of the SLP in TP3 are significantly more likely to 
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exit their initial practice location compared to SLP program participants in TP1. Note that 
in this analysis there are participants, particularly in TP3, who have yet to exit their initial 
shortage area, and therefore their total survival time is incomplete. These observations are 
called right-censored, and the cox regression correctly accounts for this type of data. 
The negative coefficient of the LOT variable suggests that the probability of 
exiting the initial shortage area location – i.e., hazard of exiting – decreases. Thus, the 
longer the training, the more time an individual will stay in their initial location. For 
example, an individual with seven years of training compared to an individual with two 
years of training results in a hazard ratio of 0.64. This means that those who train for 
seven years are 36 percent less likely than those with two years of training to exit the 
initial shortage area location.  
The variable for those who grew up in a metropolitan area is marginally 
significant with a positive coefficient and has a hazard ratio of 1.35. This indicates that 
participants with a metropolitan background are more likely to exit their initial shortage 
area compared to those with a noncore, nonmetropolitan upbringing. 	  
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Table 6.5 
    Cox Hazard Regression for Aggregated Data 
Coefficients Point Estimate  
Coefficients 
Exp(coef) Pr(>|z|) 
SLP (β1) 0.005  1.005 0.994 
AIV (β2) 0.000006  1.000 0.602 
LOT (β3) -0.090** 0.914 0.044 
Male (β4) 0.098 1.103 0.437 
Hometown Population (β51) 
10,000 – 49,999 
0.130   1.138 0.481 
Hometown Population (β52) 
50,000 < 
0.300* 1.349 0.097 
TP2 (β61) 
(1998-2006) 
0.904*** 2.470 <0.001 
TP3 (β62) 
(2007-2015) 
1.755*** 5.785 <0.001 
SLP * TP2 0.5240   1.689 0.246 
SLP * TP3 2.618*** 13.71 <0.001 
SLP * LOT 0.061   1.063 0.488 
R square 0.303 
Likelihood ratio test 107.8 p=0 
Wald test 113.3 p=0 
Score (logrank) test 161.9 p=0 
Significance codes:  0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1* 
6.2 Discussion 
6.2.1 Probit Model 
This analysis strongly supports that SLP participants are more likely than LRP 
participants to default on their service obligation. There is also variation in the probability 
of default within the SLP based on variables that are related to the likelihood of 
projection bias, and results show that the longer one spends in training, the more likely 
they are to default on their service obligation in the SLP. For example, those with longer 
training periods in the SLP, such as physicians, are more likely to default compared to 
those whose training periods are shorter in length, such as physicians assistants.  
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These results indicate that SLP participants and those with longer training periods 
in the SLP are more prone to exhibiting projection bias. Because one of the key 
differences in the programs is the duration between when the incentive is delivered and 
when the service is carried out, which is also influenced by the length of training for SLP 
participants, it suggests that the temporal gap exacerbates the effects of projection bias. 
That is, the longer the time between making the decision to participate and fulfilling the 
service obligation, the more likely one is to exhibit projection bias because temporal 
proximity influences our ability to correctly predict or anticipate our future preferences.  
Gilbert and Wilson (2007) discuss that predicting the future requires mental 
simulation of an event one has not experienced. In deciding to participate in an incentive 
program, one likely imagines or calls upon memories to predict what it would be like to 
practice in a shortage area. The problem, however, is that those simulations tend to omit 
certain features of the experience, which worsens when the event becomes more 
temporally distant (Gilbert and Wilson 2007). Students may not consider all aspects of 
practicing in a shortage area. For instance, they may spend less time considering features 
unrelated to practicing medicine or having their student debt paid off like having limited 
options of where to practice, which influences their proximity to family, having a 
significant other who prefers living in a city, or fewer social activities available. 
Predicting future preferences can also be prone to error if predictions are based on a small 
number of memories or previous experiences or if they lack context (Gilbert and Wilson 
2007). 
Not only are predictions of future preferences most likely incorrect when the 
temporal gap is long, there are also inaccuracies when an individual’s circumstances are 
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changing (Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Students in the healthcare field are exposed to 
many facets and specialties in healthcare throughout their training. Thus, considering 
experiences that occur within the training period may also be contributing to the 
significance of the LOT and program type variable. Medical students, for example, must 
commit to practicing in a primary care-related field in order to receive funds through the 
SLP. However, a portion of their training is devoted to exploring specialty areas through 
rotations, including those outside of primary care. It is possible that medical students who 
default on their obligation do so after discovering a preference for a specialty area outside 
of primary care. By underestimating that specialty preferences may change over time, 
program participants entering fields where they have the option to further specialize may 
be even more prone to exhibit projection bias.  
Furthermore, the benefit of the incentive may no longer be salient for SLP 
participants by the time they are practicing in a shortage area. Because they received the 
benefit while in school and are no longer receiving such an incentive when carrying out 
their obligation, it could increase the likelihood of SLP participants to default on their 
service obligation, especially if they were particularly motivated to participate due to the 
incentive, rather than the mission of working with underserved populations. In the LRP, 
program incentives should still be salient while they are practicing in a shortage area 
because they receive the benefits at that time. Overall, these results confirm the 
hypothesis (H4) that LOT exacerbates the propensity of exhibiting projection bias within 
the SLP. 
Results do not strongly support the hypothesis that increasing the perception of 
how bound one is to fulfilling their obligation – i.e., by changing the cost of default – will 
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result in a higher probability of completion. Although not significant, DC2 in the SLP 
model indicates that participants in this condition are less likely to default than those in 
DC1. Because the financial cost of defaulting does not differ between these conditions, it 
suggests that sending semi-annual letters reminding participants of their obligation may 
have positively influenced the completion rate. However, models also indicate that those 
in DC3 are more likely to default, even in the presence of semi-annual letters and a 
default cost of 150 percent plus interest. However, two-thirds of subjects participating 
under DC3 have yet to reach a program outcome, and are therefore not included in the 
analysis. Thus, the DC3 result may not reflect the long-term outcomes of this condition. 
The default condition in the LRP remained constant across time, thus the 
significance in the LRP model TP2 variable captures unobserved forces influencing 
default during this time period. Within the interacted aggregated model, participants of 
both programs in TP2 are less likely to default. This variable represents unobserved 
trends affecting the probability of default, as well as the change in the default condition in 
the SLP program, suggesting that this DC2 may have positively influenced the program 
outcome. 
The aggregated interacted model also shows that participants of the SLP in TP2 
and TP3 are more likely to default than LRP participants of the same time period. This 
further supports that SLP participants are more likely to default than LRP participants 
across time, even when the cost of default increased in the SLP program. While the 
expectation that increasing the cost of default would reduce the probability of default is 
not strongly supported in this data, behavioral economic research supports that prompting 
individuals to think more carefully about how preferences change over time results in less 
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biased predictions. It could be the case that semi-annual letters and the financial penalties 
are not explicit enough to prompt such contemplation.  
The gender (male) coefficient is negative in every model specification, and is 
marginally significant in two of the four models. This supports the hypothesis (H5) that 
men are less likely than women to default on their service obligation. While the lack of 
significance could be due to the size of the data set, it is worthy to point out the direction 
of the estimate. Studies support that women are more likely than their male counterparts 
to change their career plans or behaviors due to familial responsibilities (Brotherton et al. 
1997). These findings suggest that men may be more likely to follow-through and 
complete their original plans to practice in a healthcare shortage area compared to their 
female counterparts, indicating men may be less prone to exhibiting projection bias in 
this scenario. 
A high percentage of physicians who currently practice in nonmetropolitan areas 
grew up in similar settings, suggesting that those with experience in nonmetropolitan 
communities are more likely to return to these geographic areas (Rabinowitz et al. 1999). 
An individual calls upon their memories in predicting their future utility from an 
experience that has not yet occurred (Gilbert and Wilson 2007), and therefore it is likely 
individuals consider their previous experiences in nonmetropolitan areas when making 
program participation decisions. Participants with experience living in a nonmetropolitan 
area are likely to have a greater understanding of their taste for living in these areas, and 
are therefore less likely to have biased predictions of preference for living there in the 
future. However, the relationship between hometown population and the likelihood of 
completing the service obligation is insignificant in every model specification. The SLP 
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model does indicate that participants who grew up in a micropolitan or metropolitan 
community are more likely to default on their service obligations, which supports H3, yet 
the LRP model suggests the opposite. Furthermore, the aggregated models indicate that 
those who grew up in a micropolitan city are more likely to default while those with a 
metropolitan background are less likely to default. The small proportion of participants 
with metropolitan or micropolitan backgrounds could contribute to the insignificance and 
conflicting direction of hometown population variables, as only 10 percent and 13 
percent of program participants in the analysis are of a metropolitan and micropolitan 
backgrounds, respectively.  
The AIV appears to have no influence on the probability of defaulting or 
completing a program outcome. This is the case with and without including SLP 
participants who received the low-interest loan. While greater incentive values may 
entice more individuals to participate in healthcare financial incentive programs, it 
appears that the value of the incentive does not influence one’s likelihood of completing 
or defaulting on their obligation. Thus, the impact of varying incentive values does not 
appear to influence the propensity of exhibiting projection bias. The consistent 
insignificance of this variable is an interesting result, as it suggests that the value of 
incentives healthcare professionals receive doesn’t influence the likelihood that one will 
be recruited and fulfill a service obligation in a shortage area. In combination with weak 
evidence that default conditions deter default outcomes, it appears that individuals are 
influenced by factors beyond financial considerations of their service contract in making 
default or fulfillment decisions, and that financial incentives or penalties may not be 
adequate in prompting individuals to accurately predict future preferences.   
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6.2.2 Other Considerations 
LOT is a consistent variable across models involving SLP participants, leading to 
the conclusion that LOT leads to greater likelihood of defaulting on service-obligations 
within student-targeted programs. This is certainly influenced by physicians, who have 
the longest training of all professionals in the data. While physicians could be more likely 
to default if salaries in non-shortage areas were markedly higher than those in shortage 
areas, evidence on physician salaries suggests that this is not the case. The Center for 
Studying Health Systems Change (2005)	reports the difference between metro and non-
metro physician income is negligible. Furthermore, after adjusting for cost of living in 
metro and non-metro areas, adjusted physician income is actually greater in non-metro 
areas. Because of this, and lack of usable, spatially explicit data on incomes across 
professions, income earnings between metro and non-metro areas were not utilized in the 
regression.   
6.2.3 Survival Analysis 
Because this analysis excludes all participants who defaulted on their service 
obligation prior to or shortly after entering a shortage area, it excludes those subjects who 
exhibited initial signs of projection bias. By defaulting before beginning practice in a 
shortage area, individuals demonstrated their imperfection at predicting what future 
preferences would result in the greatest level of utility. Thus, by only including those who 
have completed their service obligation, subjects in this analysis inherently have a lower 
propensity of exhibiting projection bias in terms of their practice specialty and shortage 
area location, as all spent the time required in their shortage area. However, recall that 
equation 3 describes that individuals will complete their practice obligation if the 
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difference in utility between their ideal practice location in state s and utility in the 
shortage area location is less than the cost of default. Thus, even if participants complete 
their practice obligation, projection bias-related forces may lead some practitioners to 
systematically leave shortage areas earlier than others in pursuit of a practice location that 
provides greater utility than their shortage area location. While the coefficients used in 
this analysis are the same as in the probit analysis, I am cautious to suggest that these are 
strong indicators of projection bias, rather than predictors of how soon one is likely to 
exit their initial shortage area location.  
This analysis found that the only variable that decreases the hazard of exiting the 
initial shortage area is LOT, and the longer individuals spend in training results in a lower 
hazard of participants exiting their initial shortage area. For example, a physician is 
predicted to remain in their initial location longer than a physician assistant. This could 
be influenced by the fact that those at the peak of their profession may have an 
opportunity to own or buy-into their own healthcare practice. Ownership of practice is a 
determinant of retention used in previous studies, and Pathman et al. (2004b) reports that 
retention among incentive program participants is longer for those who owned their 
practice.  
The significance of the time period variables indicate that there are unobserved 
forces influencing the hazard of exiting the shortage area during these time periods. I 
anticipate that common determinants of retention that are not included in this analysis, 
such as one’s satisfaction in the healthcare system, work-life balance factors, and familial 
satisfaction in the community could be picked up in these variables. The interaction 
between SLP and TP3 could also reflect these factors.  
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Results indicate that those with a metropolitan background will spend less time in 
the initial shortage area compared to those with a nonmetro upbringing. Although 
previous studies indicate that one’s background is not related to how long they remain 
practicing in their initial shortage area, this results supports the hypothesis (H3) that those 
drawing upon experiences of living in a nonmetro area are less likely to have biased 
predictions of the utility they will experience by living and working in similar areas.  
6.3 Reducing Projection Bias in Healthcare Financial Incentive Programs 
Incorrectly predicting how preferences will change over time decreases the 
quality of decisions individuals make for themselves. Incorrectly predicting preferences 
regarding practice location can have significant financial consequences both for the 
individual and state and federal incentive program, making it increasingly important to 
understand how the magnitude of projection bias can be reduced. 
Initial predictions of future preferences require time, motivation, and cognitive 
resources. When any of these are lacking, adjusting preferences are inaccurate and biases 
will occur. Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson (2005) found that prompting individuals to 
think more carefully about the process of adaptation could reduce projection bias. While I 
expected that semi-annual letters and changes to the cost of default would induce 
individuals to think more carefully about their preferences over time, results do not 
strongly support default condition changes resulted in higher completion rates. Thus, it is 
possible that a more explicit prompt, perhaps an exercise before or during the incentive 
program application process, could help guide individuals to consider their experience in 
professional school and how these experiences may influence their practice preferences 
in the future. Furthermore, because a major cause of projection bias in healthcare 
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financial incentive programs is caused by the temporal gap between when an incentive is 
received and service obligation is carried out, prompting individuals to mentally simulate 
what it is like to live and work in a shortage area and then correct for its temporal 
location could help to overcome some bias (Gilbert, Gill and Wilson 2002). Such 
correction could involve prompting individuals to consider features outside of medicine 
that they may not otherwise consider, or prompting students to consider how their state 
between the current time period and future will change.  
If individuals do not invest adequate cognitive resources in assessing their future 
preferences, it will cause their predictions to be overly influenced by current feelings 
rather than by their knowledge of the event’s temporal location (Gilbert, Gill, and Wilson 
2002). Thus, giving decisions adequate time to think about the utility these decisions will 
provide when experienced across a variety of scenarios, temporal locations, or states is 
important in reducing the magnitude of projection bias. 
Programs may also consider limiting who is eligible for programs based on the 
length of training remaining. It appears that student-targeted programs are best designed 
for professionals with shorter training periods, which would shorten the temporal gap 
between the time of deciding to participate and the time the service obligation is carried 
out. If student-targeted programs were specifically designed for mid-level healthcare 
professionals or if those with longer training periods received a financial incentive later 
on in training–e.g., the end of school or beginning of residency–it could decrease the 
magnitude of projection bias and improve outcomes of student-targeted programs.  
Projection bias could also be reduced and program outcomes improved if the 
financial incentive in the SLP were made salient at the time the program obligation is 
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being fulfilled. One strategy to do so would be to wait to award a small portion of the 
financial incentive once providers are practicing in a shortage area.  
Continuing the practice of providing incentives to those with demonstrated 
experience of living in nonmetro, underserved areas is important in mitigating the 
strength of projection bias. It could also reduce bias and improve completion rates to 
require that all participants experience a rotation in a shortage area location prior to 
committing to an incentive program.  
6.4 Limitations 
 The HPTS repository only tracks healthcare providers in Nebraska and western 
Iowa. Thus, there is potential for bias due to missing data of those who left the State of 
Nebraska and are no longer tracked through the HPTS. Additionally, a portion of the 
HPTS is self-reported through provider surveys and relies solely on the response of 
healthcare providers. Variables such as high school graduation city, for instance, are 
missing from a portion of observations due to nonresponse and are excluded from the 
analysis.  
The timeline of the data collection and tracking of healthcare providers is a 
limitation to this research. The first incentive program began in 1979, but HPTS tracking 
didn’t start until 1995. While this primarily affects participants of the SLP, there is likely 
missing data of location and duration of practice prior to 1995. The research controls for 
this discrepancy by identifying providers whose first practice location in the HPTS 
matches the service-obligation practice location reported by the Nebraska Department of 
Health and Human Services to ensure data accuracy. This limitation only influences the 
survival analysis regression, and is unlikely to affect the probit model regression, as it 
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simply looks at the program outcome, and does not consider practice locations 
immediately after training.    
The cox hazard regression analysis does not take into account the subsequent 
practice location. It is possible that even when individuals exit their initial shortage area, 
they relocate to a different shortage area location. This analysis also does not account for 
common determinants of retention such as workplace and community satisfaction, 
practice and community attributes, or additional personal characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Financial incentive programs are likely to become increasingly attractive to young 
professionals. As the debt burden of students increases, so does the propensity to enroll in 
a financial incentive program (Jackson et al. 2003). In order to influence the impact that 
financial incentive programs have in addressing geographic healthcare disparities, it is 
vital to analyze what program design features and participant characteristics are most 
likely to result in completed program outcomes. Understanding the psychological forces 
that are influenced by these features makes studying behavioral economic concepts such 
as projection bias relevant in designing programs to alleviate underserved healthcare 
populations. 
This analysis addresses which elements of program design in student-targeted and 
professional-targeted programs are likely to be influenced by projection bias, and if these 
elements are expected to counteract or contribute to its prevalence. If design elements of 
certain programs give way to the likelihood of projection bias, then the efficacy of these 
programs may be hindered. Overall, this analysis supports that participants of student-
targeted programs are significantly more likely to exhibit projection bias, and therefore 
default on service obligations. Furthermore, the longer students are in training, the more 
likely they are to make biased predictions about their future practice preferences within 
student-targeted programs such as the SLP. These results are likely caused by the 
temporal gap between when the commitment to practice in a shortage area is made and 
when the service obligation is carried out. The greater the time between these points 
results in higher magnitudes of projection bias, and therefore higher likelihood of 
defaulting on one’s service obligation. Although those who had longer training periods 
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were more likely to exhibit projection bias in terms of fulfilling their practice obligation, 
of those who did complete their obligation, participants with greater training periods had 
a lower hazard of exiting their initial shortage location.  
The extension of projection bias theory proposed in this thesis, along with 
previous studies, suggest there is potential to decrease the magnitude of projection bias 
by increasing the perception of how bound one is to fulfilling their obligation. While the 
results of this research do not strongly support this claim, additional research could 
provide insight into what features are likely to make participants feel more bound to their 
obligation. High default costs do not appear to have a strong impact on biased predictions 
or program completion rates. Conducting experiments to explore why financial penalties 
do not correct behavior and what type of prompts would induce greater cognitive effort in 
predicting future preferences, leading to de-biased decisions, could provide insight into 
this observation.  
By addressing the causes of projection bias and strategies to decrease its 
prevalence, it is possible to improve program outcomes for student-targeted programs. By 
inducing students to think more carefully about how their specialty and practice location 
preferences may change over time, and the new experiences they will encounter 
throughout the course of their training, individuals may decrease their bias by placing less 
weight on their current preferences. Furthermore, providing student-targeted incentives to 
mid-level healthcare providers could improve the outcomes of these programs because 
they have shorter training periods. 
Despite the many efforts and interventions that have been implemented by 
medical schools, the federal and state governments, and healthcare systems, 
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nonmetropolitan healthcare disparities persist, requiring that additional research, 
innovation, and collaboration are needed among stakeholders to achieve long-term 
solutions to this issue. 	  
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